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Troublemaker or Peacemaker? Andreas Papandreou, the Euromissile Crisis 
and the policy of peace, 1981-1986 
 
Introduction 
¶2Qthe balcony, the primary soapbox of the Greek politician, his manner and his 
speech are transformed. He plants his feet in the stance of a prizefighter and slices 
the air with his hands, his heavy eyebrows drawing together, his voice mocking 
and indignant in turn. His rhetoric loses the careful moderation of his private 
conversation and crystallizes into slogans that touch Greek passions and are 
scrawled RQ ZDOOV DOO RYHU WKH FRXQWU\ ´Greece for Greeks, Out of NATO, 
Changeµ·1 Commenting on Andreas Papandreou and his party·V (PASOK) ¶VKRUW
march to power·LQ2FWREHU, the British drew attention to the appeal of his 
theatrical tone and the mercurial sentimentality that seemed to beset his rhetoric. 
Preoccupation with the tone and substance of his declarations was not 
restricted to foreign observers but also Greek contemporaries and scholars of all 
political hues who struggled to decipher his words and respond to the lingering 
question of what really drove his policies and what these policies actually were in 
practice.2 In particular, Andreas Papandreou as a figure in Greek foreign policy 
has received wide coverage, and along with it, a variety of interpretative 
frameworks. In popular imagination, he is remembered as a maverick, but scholars 
have struggled to understand how genuine or effective was this policy of dissent, 
or notoriously dubbed ¶WURXEOHPDNLQJ·3 IQDVVHVVLQJ3DSDQGUHRX·VIRUHLJQSROLF\, 
Theodore Couloumbis had suggested to differentiate between core and peripheral 
issues to bridge the gap in the literature that debates whether 3DSDQGUHRX·s 
                                                     
 
1 Wilson (FCO) to Sutherland (Athens), 5 February 1982, The National Archives (hereafter: TNA), 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (hereafter: FCO) 9/3516.  
2 Michalis Spourdalakis, The Rise of the Greek Socialist Party (London & New York: Routledge, 1988). 
3 Richard Clogg (ed.), Greece, 1981-89: The Populist Decade (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993). 
  
2 
foreign policy marked a radical rupture from the past or was in fact the 
continuation of past practices.4  
However, this DUWLFOH·V empirical research shifts the focus from such 
divisions and classifications and instead proposes that Andreas Papandreou 
attempted to combine and consciously fuse together different foreign policy fronts 
LQWRZKDWKHGXEEHGWKH ¶SROLF\RISHDFH·. 3DSDQGUHRX·V ULVH WRSRZHUFRLQFLGHG
with heightened Cold War tensions of the 1980s and the unfolding of the 
Euromissile crises that saw deep controversy across Europe over the proposed 
deployment of a new generation of delivery nuclear systems in both East and 
West.5 Against this background, peace politics either at elite or public opinion level 
tended to refer to nuclear and anti-nuclear politics, but it also became a shorthand 
for ¶FRPPXQLFDWLYHDQGV\PEROLFGHEDWHVDQGFRQWHVWDWLRQVDERXWWKHVKDSHIRUP
DQGRUGHURI WKHSROLWLFDO·.6 Peace mobilisation transformed political participation 
and aided in the emergence of both a national and transnational civil society.7 
Across Europe, the fear of nuclear annihilation and the question of nuclear 
weapons ZDV ¶LPDJLQHG· and interpreted in different ways by politicians and 
activists.8 
 In Greece, Papandreou tapped into these diverse peace discourses and 
framed the policy of peace in ardent nationalist terms while subscribing an 
international cause. The scope of the policy of peace was not solely restricted to 
discussion of nuclear armaments but involved the renegotiation of the American 
                                                     
 
4 Theodore A. &RXORXPELV¶3$62.·V)RUHLJQ3ROLFLHV-&RQWLQXLW\RU&KDQJH"·LQ&ORJJ
Richard (ed.), Greece 1981-89: The Populist Decade, 120; Van CoufoXGDNLV¶*UHHN)RUHLJQ3ROLF\6LQFH
4XHVWIRU,QGHSHQGHQFH·Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 6:1 (1988), 61-62 [55-78]. 
5 Leopoldo Nuti, Frederic Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey and Bernd Rother (eds.), The Euromissile Crisis and the 
End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press; California, Stanford University 
Press, 2015). 
6 +ROJHU1HKULQJDQG+HOJH3KDUR¶,QWURGXFWLRQ$3HDFHIXO(XURSH"1HJRWLDWLQJ3HDFHLQWhe 
7ZHQWLHWK&HQWXU\·, Contemporary European History, 17:3 (2008), 278 
7  Kathrin Fahlenbrach, Martin Klimke & Joachim Scharloth (eds.), Protest Cultures: A Companion (New 
York: Berghahn books, 2016) 
8 Matthew Grant and Benjamin Ziemann (eds.), Understanding the imaginary war. Culture, thought and nuclear 
conflict (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016). 
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bases on Greek soil, relations with NATO, Balkan regional schemes for nuclear 
weapons free zones and international initiatives with the Third World.9 But mostly 
it was framed as the struggle against the perceived and real Turkish threat and the 
alleged American favouritism towards the latter. As a NATO document noted, 
¶[Greek] people are made to believe that the struggle for peace and disarmament is 
at the same time a national struggle for Greece and vice YHUVD·10 It also had a 
relevant domestic angle with the active involvement of Papandreou himself in the 
often neglected, albeit dynamic, Greek peace movement. Actually, Greece was an 
interesting case RISHDFHPRELOLVDWLRQZKHUH¶DQWLQXFOHDUDWWLWXGHVZHUH widespread 
LQ*UHHFHIURPWKHJUDVVURRWVWRWKHKLJKHVWOHYHOVRISRZHU·.11 
To understand therefore the idiosyncrasies and complexities of the Greek 
policy of peace it is vital to demonstrate the multifaceted interaction between 
various dimensions of the governmental policy-making, long-term developments in 
political culture and its relation to the national peace movement activism. 
Recognising the perils of subscribing to a great man theory framework, the article 
will nonetheless concentrate on Andreas Papandreou as our archival research and 
WKH FRQVHQVXV LQ WKH OLWHUDWXUH SRLQW WR WKH FHQWUDOLW\ RI 3$62.·V OHDGHU LQ
PDVWHUPLQGLQJ LPSOHPHQWLQJ DQG OHJLWLPLVLQJ WKH FRXQWU\·VPDMRU foreign policy 
decisions.12 The analysis will be situated against the unfolding drama of the 
Euromissile crisis, as well as the specific historical and cultural peculiarities that  
dictated foreign policy priorities, ranging from the Turkish threat to the 
recognition of the peripheral status of a junior actor such as Greece. 
                                                     
 
9 7KHUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK((&DQG1$72KDVUHFHLYHG WKH OLRQ·VVKDUHRIVFKRODUO\DWWHQWLRQEXWDYHU\
important aspect has been neglected, that of nuclear politics. 
10 Note by the Secretary General, Brussels, 29 January 1982, NATO Archives, C-M(82)4. 
11 Lawrence S. Wittner, The Struggle Against the Bomb. Towards Nuclear Abolition. A History of the World Nuclear 
Disarmament Movement. 1971 to Present (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 163. 
12 Kevin Featherstone and Dimitris Papadimitriou, Prime Ministers in Greece. The Paradox of Power (Oxford: 
2[IRUG8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV-RKQ2,DWULGHV¶%HQHDWKWKH6RXQGDQGWKH)XU\865HODWLRQV
ZLWKWKH3$62.*RYHUQPHQW·LQ5LFKDUG&ORJJHGGreece, 1981-89: The Populist Decade (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 1993), 154-166; /\NRXUJRV.RXUNRXYHODV¶0RQLWRULQJWKHULVHRIDUDGLFDOIRUFHWKH
British Embassy in Athens and the Ascent of the Greek Panhellenic Socialist Movement, 1974-·
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 17:3 (2017), 485-503. 
  
4 
Original material from the FCO, Reagan Library, the CIA, Mitterrand and 
NATO archives as well as the international and domestic press illustrate the 
international and national developments that influenced GreHFH·VSHDFHSROLF\. The 
analysis compensates for the scarcity of Greek official governmental records 
during this period by using the Karamanlis archives, selected files from the Amalia 
Fleming archive as well as national newspapers and the Greek parliament debates 
to shed light on the semantic context of the policy, as it developed, within the 
Greek society. 
  The piece will enrich the understanding of Greek foreign policy with fresh 
archival research that illuminates some of its neglected dimensions while paying 
GXH DWWHQWLRQ WR WKH UHDFWLRQ RI *UHHFH·V major allies. Moreover, the globalised 
interpretation will offer new ways of thinking of possible margins of manoeuvres 
available to small states operating within Cold War dynamics. The recent 
declassification of archival material pertaining to the Euromissiles crisis and the 
ensuing (re)surge of peace mobilisation and peace policies have attracted the 
attention of historians with a particular focus on the western European countries 
that planned to install ¶the Euromissiles·.13 In contrast, Greece and Southern 
Europe, in general, is still terra incognita.14 ([DPLQLQJ*UHHFH·VSROLF\RISHDFHZLOO
add an important piece to the complicated puzzle of the Euromissile crisis as well 
DVWKHFRXQWU\·V turbulent 1980s.  
 
 
The Advent of PASOK and its relation to NATO during the Euromissile 
years 
                                                     
 
13 The most recent examples: Special issue on German Politics & Society 33:4 (2015); Holger Nehring & 
%HQMDPLQ=LHPDQQ¶'R$OO3DWKV/HDGVWR0RVFRZ"7KH1$72GXDOWUDFNGHFLVLRQDQGWKHSHDFH
movements- DFULWLTXH·Cold War History 12:1 (2012), 1-24; Eckart Conze, Martin Klimke, Jeremy Varon 
(eds.), Nuclear Threats, Nuclear Fear and the Cold War of the 1980s (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2017). 
14 An exception is Leopoldo Nuti, ´0H WRR SOHDVH· ,WDO\ DQG WKH SROLWLFV RI QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV ²
··Diplomacy & Statecraft, 4:1 (1993), 114-148;  
  
5 
The possible introduction of the neutron bomb and the 1979 1$72·V¶GXDOWUDFN·
decision not only aggravated the fear RI ¶OLPLWHG QXFOHDU ZDU· LQ (XURSH, but, 
significantly, along with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, dealt the coup de grâce to 
the spirit of superpower détente.15 1$72·V¶GXDO-WUDFN·GHFLVLRQRI'HFHPEHU
1979 provided for the deployment of advanced, new generation long-range theatre 
nuclear Forces (LRTNF): 108 US Pershing II launchers and 464 US Gryphon 
ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM). In addition, the alliance made an offer to 
.UHPOLQRQQHJRWLDWLRQVRQWKHVFDOHRI1$72·V/571)LIWKH8665UHGXFHGits 
recently deployed and still expanding new generation INF (Intermediate-range 
Nuclear Forces), the SS-20s. The decision was a product of very long and complex 
intra-allied negotiation process, where West European political and military 
policymakers and officials initially took the lead to persuade the United States to 
respond firmly to Soviet nuclear initiatives.16  
As 1$72 DGRSWHG WKH ¶GXDO WUDFN· GHFLVLRQ LQ 'HFHPEHU  WKH
conservative Karamanlis government WKDW OHG WKH FRXQWU\·V VPRRWK
democratization process following the fall of the junta in the summer of 1974 and 
had successfully concluded negotiations to enter the EEC as a full member in May 
1979,17 ZDV SUHRFFXSLHG ZLWK QHJRWLDWLQJ *UHHFH·V IXOO UHWXUQ WR WKH DOOLDQFH·V
integrated command structure.18 In August 1974, rapidly growing anti-
Americanism and the humiliating consequences of the recent double Turkish 
                                                     
 
15 LDZUHQFH)UHHGPDQ¶1RWHRIWKHPRQWK7KHQHXWURQERPEUHWXUQVµWorld Today 37/3 (1981), 81-87. 
A variety of factors explain the fall of détente during the late 1970s. See for more, Raymond Garthoff, 
Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC: The Brookings 
Institution, 1985); Jussi M. Hanhimäki, The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and the 
Transformation of the Cold War (Washington, DC: Potomac Books 2013); also, Olav Njølstad¶7KH&ROODSVH
of Superpower Détente, 1975-·LQLeffler, Melvyn and Westad, Arne (eds.), The Cambridge History of 
the Cold War (vol. 3) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 135-55. 
16 Kristina Spohr Readman ¶&RQIOLFW DQG &RRSHUDWLRQ LQ ,QWUD-Alliance Nuclear Politics: Western 
(XURSHWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQGWKH*HQHVLVRI1$72·V'XDO7UDFN'HFLVLRQ-·Journal of Cold 
War Studies 13/2 (2011), pp. 41-3. 
17 Eirini Karamouzi, Greece, the EEC and the Cold War: The Second Enlargement (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014).  
18 'LRQ\VLRV&KRXUFKRXOLVDQG/\NRXUJRV.RXUNRXYHODV¶*UHHNSHUFHSWLRQVRI1$72GXULQJWKH&ROG
:DU·Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 12:4 (2012), 507. 
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invasion in Cyprus pressured the newly installed government in Athens to act.19 
Greek Defence Minister Evangelos Averoff, the military leadership, and, 
eventually, Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis, all concluded that war against 
Turkey would be a highly dangerous option, as the seven years of the junta had left 
the Greek armed forces in a fragile state.20 Instead of war, on 14 August 1974 
.DUDPDQOLVDQQRXQFHGWKHFRXQWU\·VZLWKGUDZDOIURP1$72·VLQWHJUDWed military 
structure and requested renegotiations on the future of US bases on Greek soil.21 
 However, Greece did not withdraw IURP 1$72·V 1XFOHDU 3ODQQLQJ
Group (NPG) and the Americans did not remove the nuclear warheads deployed 
there.22 Within NPG, therefore, the .DUDPDQOLV JRYHUQPHQW VXSSRUWHG 1$72·V
¶GXDOWUDFN·decision, partly because it genuinely believed that the nuclear balance in 
Europe had been shaken due to the deployment of the SS-20, but also because no 
Cruise or Pershing II missiles ² or in fact any additional nuclear warheads and 
delivery systems ² were about to be deployed on Greek territory. However, it is 
clear that Karamanlis also believed that the West should seek to alleviate excessive 
Soviet fears, reduce tensions and distrust, and seek a stable equilibrium regarding 
both nuclear and conventional forces of the two blocs. 23  
At the same time, PASOK, under the leadership of Andreas Papandreou, 
had become the main opposition party following the elections of November 1977. 
                                                     
 
19 Ivan-Andre Slengesol¶$%DG6KRZ"7KH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQGWKH&\SUXV&ULVLV·Mediterranean 
Quarterly, 22: 2 (2000), 96-129; .RQVWDQWLQD%RWVLRX¶$QWL-$PHULFDQLVPLQ*UHHFH·LQAnti-Americanism: 
History, Causes and ThemesHG%UHQGRQ2·&RQQRUYRO2[IRUG:HVWSRUW CT, 2007), 213-345. 
20 Estimate of Turkish military capabilities on Cyprus, 13 August 1974, CIA Records Search Tool 
(CREST), CIA-RDP79B01737A00210008000-1; Constantinos Svolopoulos (ed.), Constantinos Karamanlis: 
Archives, Event and Texts [in Greek], vol.8 (Athens, 1997) (hereafter Karamanlis), 84-88. 
21  -RKQ,DWULGHV¶&KDOOHQJLQJWKH/LPLWDWLRQVRIWKH$WODQWLF&RPPXQLW\Konstantinos Karamanlis and 
1$72·LQ6YRORSRXORV.RQVWDQWLQRVHWDOHGVKonstantinos Karamanlis in the Twentieth Century (vol. 2) 
(Athens: Karamanlis Foundation: 2008), 17- 36. 
22 MoD draft reply to Lord Jenkins question, 10-15 December 1981, TNA/FCO 46/2761. Also, Leslie 
*HOE¶866:HLJKV6WDWXVRI1XFOHDU:DUKHDGVLQ*UHHFH·The New York Times, 11 September 1974, and 
&ODXGLD:ULJKW¶7KH86*UHHFHDQG$-$UPV·The New York Times, 27 February 1981. 
23 .DUDPDQOLV· UHVSRQVH WR %UH]KQHY  1RYHPEHU  .RQVWDQWLQRV .DUDPDQOLV )RXQGDWLRQ
(hereafter: KKF), Konstantinos Karamanlis Archives (hereafter: KKA), File 57B; Note on conversation 
between Karamanlis and Italian Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga, 25 October 1979, KKF/KKA, File 
52B. 
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3$62.·V HOHFWRUDO ULVH had caused much apprehension to US analysts and 
officials, VRPH RI WKHP HYHQ IHDULQJ WKDW ¶by the time the first Carter 
Administration completes its term, GreecH FRXOG EH D GLVDVWHU DUHD DJDLQ·.24 In 
foreign policy, PASOK had stood at first for non-alignment based on hostility to 
7XUNH\ GLVWUXVW RI WKH 86$ UHMHFWLRQ RI *UHHFH·V LGHQWLILFDWLRQ ZLWK WKH :HVW
support for Mediterranean socialist grouping and for closer links with the Arab 
ZRUOG DQG ZLWK *UHHFH·V QRUWKHUQ neighbours in the Balkans.25 Since 1977 
Papandreou had started, however, to moderate his rhetoric on his foreign policy 
goals.26 He had understood that his party would have to shift its foreign policy 
declarations to attract as much of the rapidly increasing lower-middle-class voters 
while also reassuring the Greek establishment ² including the military.27 But even 
in 1981, during the long election campaign, he was still promising to pull Greece 
out of NATO (which Greece had finally rejoined NATO as a full member in 
October 1980)28, to close the US bases  in the country (although this would require 
US-Greek negotiations and an unspecified amount of time), to remove US nuclear 
ZDUKHDGV IURP *UHHN WHUULWRU\ DQG WR KROG D UHIHUHQGXP UHJDUGLQJ *UHHFH·V
membership of the EEC.29  
Papandreou exploited deeply held popular frustration at what had been seen 
as GreHFH·VVXEVHUYLHQFHWRWKH:HVWand particularly the United States, as well as 
.DUDPDQOLV· FRQVHUYDWLYH  SDUW\·V 1HZ 'HPRFUDF\ perceived failure to curb 
                                                     
 
24 Memo by Henze to Brzezinski on Greek Election Outcome, 21 November 1977, Declassified 
Documents Reference System (DDRS), doc. CK3100483060. 
25 6HHIRULQVWDQFH3$62.·V)RXQGLQJ'HFODUDWLRQRIrd September 1974; Andreas Papandreou, Greece 
to the Greeks [in Greek] (Athens: Karanassis, 1976). For the rise of Andreas Papandreou on the political 
scene, read the seminal work of Stan Draenos, Andreas Papandreou. The Making of a Greek Democrat and 
Political Maverick (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012); and Takis Pappas, The charismatic party: PASOK, Papandreou, 
Power [in Greek] (Athens: Patakis, 2009), 63-184. 
26 Stearns (Athens) to State Department, 14 January 1982, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (RRPL), 
Staff Member and Office File collections (hereafter: SMOF), Executive Secretariat, NSC, Box 15. 
27 &RXORXPELV¶3$62.·V)RUHLJQ3ROLFLHV·-118. 
28 Stefan Maximilian Brenner, Die NATO im griechisch-türkischen Konflikt 1954 bis 1989 (Berlin & Boston: 
De Gruyter, 2017), 258-264. 
29 PASOK Publications, Socialist Party Manifesto ² Contract with the People [in Greek], (Athens, 1981), pp. 31-
37.   
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foreign influence anG PDNH *UHHFH·V YRLFH KHDUG SURSHUO\ RQ WKH world stage.30 
Diverse cultural, political and ideological factors determined anti-Americanism 
during the post-war years, but what was different in the post-junta period was that 
the phenomenon ceased to be solely the playing field of the Left.31 To some extent, 
the Right also distanced itself from its post-FLYLO ZDU DWWLWXGHV ¶DV DQ HOHPHQW RI
SDWULRWLVP·LQWKHSROLWLFDOFOLPDWHRIWKH¶SRVW-MXQWDSHULRG·which discredited the 
American influence. Anti-Americanism therefore, to a degree transformed into a 
factor of national unity that superseded the Cold War consensus of the pre-junta 
years and offered a fertile ground for Andreas Papandreou·s ideas and policies.32 
When PASOK eventually won the general election on 18 October 1981, 
even US policymakers and intelligence officials appeared rather relieved that the 
Greek Socialists had secured a clear mandate to govern, thus hopefully assuring 
governmental stability and encouraging moderation. They assessed that the Greek 
SULPHPLQLVWHUZRXOG¶try to strike a more indeSHQGHQWSRVHLQIRUHLJQDIIDLUV·, but 
that he would move cautiously in his relations with NATO and the United States. 
The removal of US nuclear weapons seemed probable, and, according to the 
AmeriFDQV 3DSDQGUHRX ZDV OLNHO\ WR ¶follow the earliest Gaullist practice of 
limiting military cooperation in NATO and VWUHVVLQJ 1$72·V SROLWLFDO UROH·.33 
However, American and West European officials acknowledged that the future 
course of Greek foreign policy under Papandreou was a bit of a mystery.34 Even 
the Reagan administration (especially the State Department), which was extremely 
concerned about PapanGUHRX·Vmedium-term intentions, was ¶ready to do business 
                                                     
 
30 Rhodes (Athens) to Synnott (FCO), 18 December 1984, TNA/FCO 9/4657. Also, Kostas Simitis, 
Courses of Life [in Greek] (Athens: Polis, 2015), 286. 
31 Quoted in .RQVWDQWLQD(%RWVLRX¶7KH,QWHUIDFH%HWZHHQ3ROLWLFVDQG&XOWXUHLQ*UHHFH·LQ6WHSKDQ
Alexandre (ed.), The Americanization of Europe. Culture, Diplomacy and Anti-Americanism after 1945 (New York 
and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2006), 280. 
32 =LQRYLD/LDOLRXWL¶*UHHN&ROG:DUDQWL-Americanism in Perspective, 1947-·Journal of Transatlantic 
studies, 13:1 (2015), 47. 
33 Memorandum on Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe, 23 October 1981, CREST, CIA-
RDP83B01027R00050024-7. 
34 3UHSDUDWLRQIRU3DSDQGUHRX·VYLVLWWR)UDQFHRQ1RYHPEHU´'HMHXQHUDO·(O\VpHµ1RWH3RXU
/H 3UHVLGHQW 'H /D 5HSXEOLTXHµ IURP +XEHUW Vendrine, Mitterrand Archives, AG/5(4)/CD/270, 
Dossier 5 
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with the new government in Athens, to respond to reasonable requests and to see 
Greece remain LQWKHDOOLDQFH·, while it did not expect to be confronted with abrupt 
Greek demands.35  
Those estimates proved accurate. ,Q WKH DIWHUPDWK RI 3$62.·V ODQGVOLGH
victory, the new prime minister and his government were stuck between a rock and 
a hard place. The post-1974 populist and nationalist rhetoric had significantly 
nurtured anti-American sentiment which had already permeated the majority of the 
Greek people.36 Papandreou and his associates genuinely wished to break free from 
*UHHFH·V&ROG:DUFRPPLWPHQWVDQGGXULQJWKHVUHPDLQHGKLJKO\FULWLFDORI
the policies and Cold War rhetoric of the Reagan administration. The Greeks were 
also annoyed at the professed insensitiveness of Washington to the pride and 
particular needs of its smallest allies, such as Greece.37 Furthermore, during his stay 
in the United States, Papandreou himself had been a Left Liberal who resented 
¶QHR-FRQVHUYDWLYH· 86-style capitalism and :DVKLQJWRQ·V SROLFLHV DURXQG WKH
world.38 However, Greek security interests required that the relationship between 
Greece and the United States (and NATO) not be fundamentally altered in the 
short to medium term. Papandreou and his ministers, like their conservative 
predecessors, became painfully aware that Greece could not afford either to 
withdraw from NATO or to break its relations with the US for one overriding 
factor: Turkey. The Turkish threat not only dictated the FRXQWU\·V foreign policy 
direction and considerable resources to defence; it also loomed large in the Greek 
public imagination.39 $FFRUGLQJ WR 0LWWHUUDQG·V DGYLVRU -HDQ-Michel Gaillard: 
¶PRUH WKDQ HYHU WKH DFWLRQV RI neighbour Turkey in the region determines the 
foreign policy of Greece. Devoting 6.7% of its GDP to its defence, it cannot go 
                                                     
 
35 Henderson (Washington) to FCO, 26 November 1981, FCO 46/2761. 
36 0DYURJRUGDWRV*HWDO¶7KH3ROLWLFDO&XOWXUHRI6RXWKHUQ(XURSH$)RXU1DWLRQ6WXG\·
GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. 
37 ,DWULGHV¶%HQHDWKWKH6RXQGDQGWKH)XU\·-158. 
38 Georgios Papoulias, Essays on Diplomacy and Politics [in Greek] (Athens: Benaki Museum, 2012), 138. 
39 )RUDYHU\DFFXUDWHDQDO\VLVDQGSUHGLFWLRQRI3$62.·VIRUHLJQDQGGHIHQce policy, see CREST, Special 
DQDO\VLV E\ . +RFKVWHLQ RQ 3DSDQGUHRX·V )RUHLJQ 3ROLF\  -DQXDU\  &,$-
RDP84T00301R0001000100-39-4.  
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IXUWKHURUIDFHQRUWKDQGHDVWVLPXOWDQHRXVO\·40 In fact, Papandreou had repeatedly 
made clear that Turkey, and not the USSR or the Soviet bloc, was viewed as the 
PDLQ IRH ¶:H UHDOO\KDYH D XQLTXH SUREOHP LQ*UHHFHZKLFK UHDOO\ \RXGR QRW
meet in any other country, member of the alliance. We sense a threat from an ally 
RQRXUHDVW7XUNH\·+HSRLQWHGRXWWKDW1$72ZDVRIIHULQJDJXDUDQWHHagainst 
a Soviet bloc DWWDFN IURPWKHQRUWK HYHQ LI ¶WKHUH LVQRYLVLEOH WKUHDW·, but what 
*UHHFHQHHGHGDQGZDQWHGZDV¶a guaUDQWHHRQRXUHDVWHUQIURQWLHUV·.41  
When Andreas Papandreou presented his Government Program to the 
Parliament on 22 November 1981, he implied that Greece might again withdraw 
IURP 1$72·V LQWHJUDWHG FRPPDQG VWUXFWXUH DV ORQJ DV WKH DOOLDQFH GLG QRW
guarantee Greece·V eastern borders. However, no explicit threat or implicit hint to 
pull out of NATO altogether was aired. In fact, he went on to carefully admit that 
¶the course oI &KDQJH ZLOO EH D ORQJ SURFHVV· and that, with regard to the 
readjustment of Greek nationaO VHFXULW\ DQG IRUHLJQSROLF\ ¶the government will 
move on gradually, step by step, always taking into consideration all facts, in order 
to secure the necessary PLOLWDU\SUHSDUHGQHVVDQGPLJKW·.42  
 7KXV WKH 3$62. JRYHUQPHQW·V VKRUW WHUP IRUHLJQ SROLF\ UHPDLQHG
vague.43 So how would that ¶&KDQJH· happen gradually? The answer was given to a 
reply WR 3UHVLGHQW 5HDJDQ·V OHWWHU RI FRQJUDWXODWLRQV where Papandreou stressed 
that RQHRI*UHHFH·V¶ILUVWGXWLHV·ZRXOGEHWKH¶strengthening of these [US-Greek] 
ties in the interests of GHPRFUDF\ SURJUHVV DQG SHDFH·.44 Such strengthening 
HQWDLOHGZD\VWRIRUWLI\*UHHFH·VGHIHQFHVagainst the Turkish threat but not to the 
extent that it threatened notions of peace and independence. In a rather 
                                                     
 
40 Briefing Note for Mitterrand from Jean-Michel Gaillard, Paris, 22 November 1983, AG/5(4)/CD/270, 
Dossier 7.  
41 Bernard Gwertzman¶*UHHFH·VOHDGHU(DVHV+LV6WDQGRQ86%DVHV·The New York Times, 26 October 
1981. 
42 Hellenic Parliament Library (hereafter: HPL), Parliament Debates, Third Period, First Session, 22 
November 1981, 15-DOVR0DUYLQH+RZH¶*UHHNV$UH7ROG7LPHWDEOH ,V'XHWR2XVW86%DVHV·The 
New York Times, 23 November 1981. 
43 ¶0U3DSDPELJXRXV·The Economist, 28 November 1981. 
44 ¶3DSDQGUHRXVRIWHQV:DVKLQJWRQDQ[LHW\·The Guardian, 21 October 1981. 
  
11 
contradictory manner, Papandreou was rejecting the Cold War straitjacket as it was 
imposed by the Americans whilst at the same time he was willing to recruit their 
help in pursuit of the ultimate national interest, namely protection from Turkey. 
For him, both heightened Cold War tensions and Turkish aggressiveness posed a 
threat to peace. Echoing this sentiment, in mid-January 1982 Papandreou held a 
private meeting with the US ambassador in Athens, Monteagle Stearns, where he 
stated that Greece wanted to remain in WKH:HVWHUQDOOLDQFHDQGWKDW¶the form of 
*UHHFH·V DVVRFiation with NATO was to be negotiated but not the fact·. When 
Stearns responded that this position was different from that of the PASOK 
programme, PapanGUHRX GHQLHG WKLV VD\LQJ WKDW ¶the PASOK program tried to 
define ultimate objectives rather than objectives that could be realized in short 
terms· [sic].45 When pressured by journalist David Tonge in The Times for his first 
interview after his election, KHIUDPHGKLV ¶FRPLQJWRWHUPVZLWKUHDOLW\·ZLWK WKH
IROORZLQJVWDWHPHQW¶$VDVRFLDOLVWPRYHPHQWZHEHOLHYHJHQXLQHO\LQGpWHQWHDQG
disarmament and we are not prepared to accept as permanent arrangements the 
existence of the two blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. But the fundamental 
question for us is Greek national interest. It is this and current practical politics- 
not ultimate goals, targets and visions - which we put before the Atlantic 
$OOLDQFH·46  
No wonder therefore that in their ILUVW 1$72·V 'HIHQFH 3ODQQLQJ
Committee (DPC) on 9 December 1981, the Greek socialists blocked NATO·V 
defence ministers from issuing a communique on their two-day meeting, 
highlighting the lack of a satisfactory statement guaranteeing Greek integrity 
against Turkish aggression.47 NATO officials evaluated this action as the product 
RI *UHHN GRPHVWLF SROLWLFV UDWKHU WKDQ DQ LQFUHDVHG WKUHDW WR WKH FRXQWU\·V
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FRQWLQXHG SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ WKH RUJDQL]DWLRQ·V PLOLWDU\ command structure. They 
DOVR DFNQRZOHGJHG WKDW WKH *UHHN DFWLRQ ZDV D ¶VRUU\ VWHS· WKDW KXUW 1$72·V
public image more than it harmed its actual functioning.48 The following day 
Papandreou announced that Greece was proceeding to limit its military 
commitments within NATO (supposedly beginning to disengage from Atlantic 
alliance commitments) and that the Hellenic Armed Forces would be used only in 
accordance with the national interests to face a possible Turkish threat, rather than 
an aggression from Warsaw Pact members. He nevertheless made it clear that he 
was not aiming to pull Greece out of the alliance; instead, he was embarking on an 
effort to obtain more advantageous terms within it.49  
3DSDQGUHRX·VWRXJKVWUDWHJ\DWWKH DPC paid dividends domestically, as he 
and PASOK won considerable support in Greece. The Greek public felt that the 
country had a leader who was standing up for Greek national interests.50 
Papandreou himself declared, while addressing PASOK MPs on 11 February 1982, 
WKDW ¶over the last three and a half months Greece had made her presence felt in 
(XURSH DQG WKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQ·.51 Indeed, by that time the PASOK government 
KDG DOVR GLVWDQFHG LWVHOI IURP LWV DOOLHV E\ZLWKKROGLQJ IXOO VXSSRUW IRU 1$72·V
declaration on Poland, thus LQLWLDWLQJWKHSUDFWLFHRI´IRRWQRWLQJµRIILFLDO1$72
documents as a means to express its disagreement with various aspects of allied 
policy (most notably those pertaining nuclear strategy).52 According to 
Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, Carolos Papoulias, the Greek government was 
trying to IROORZ ¶a policy independent of the two superpowers and would not 
                                                     
 
48 -RKQ9LQRFXU¶*UHHFH2EVWUXFWVD1$72&RPPXQLTXH·The New York Times, 10 December 1981. 
49 ¶*UHHFH/LPLWV,WV1$725ROH·The New York Times, 11 December 1981. 
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participate in a caPSDLJQ OHGE\ WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV·.53 Papandreou himself argued 
that his government wished to ease the increasing Cold War tension between East 
and West. Moreover, Greece was a small European country which could not risk 
taking part in sanctions that might bring upon it unbearable countermeasures from 
the Soviet bloc.54 After all, it had been the US administration which had imposed 
unilaterally economic sanctions against Poland and the Soviet Union after the 
imposition of martial law in Poland while pressing its West European allies to 
follow suit.55 
6RRQ $WKHQV YRLFHG GRXEWV DERXW LPSRUWDQW SULQFLSOHV RI 1$72·V
negotiating position, such as WKH$OOLDQFH·V global approach to limiting INF and the 
exclusion of French and UK nuclear forces from the negotiations with the USSR. 
For example, on 18 March 1982 Papandreou differentiated from a recent NATO 
decision and publicly endorsed a Soviet proposal put forward by Leonid Brezhnev 
to cancel (or at least postpone) the deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles 
west of the Ural Mountains; most importantly, he adopted the Soviet view which 
called for the inclusion of UK and French nuclear forces in any future East-West 
negotiations on nuclear disarmament.56 This was a tactless act which infuriated the 
UK and French governments, who considered it highly inappropriate for the 
Greek leader to raise the issue of their nuclear capacity.57 Soon, the Greek 
government also ¶UHVHUYHGLWVSRVLWLRQ·, that the preparation for the deployment of 
the Pershing II and Cruise should not proceed as scheduled, when the NATO DPC 
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issued its final press communique oQ  0D\  ZKLFK VWDWHG WKDW ¶>«@ WKH
schedule for this GHSOR\PHQWKDVWREHPDLQWDLQHG·.58 
During his policy of dissent, however, the Papandreou government quietly 
dropped the issue of the unilateral removal of US nuclear warheads from Greece. 
Such an initiative would have indeed constituted a direct challenge to US and 
NATO strategy and prestige and might have some adverse consequences on the 
balance of forces in the Balkans. On the contrary, Papandreou favoured and toyed 
with the idea of regional denuclearization, which, as analyzed later on, was a 
remote prospect. Thus, no matter how much irritating his initiatives might appear 
to the West, he was able to project himself and his country as sincere advocates of 
peace and as independent actors, without essentially risking an actual confrontation 
with his NATO allies.  
 
 
The US Bases and the Greek peace movements 
Since 1953, Greece hosted four US bases and several other facilities. While no 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) were installed there in the aftermath 
of Sputnik (largely because of the strong reaction of the pacifist movement and the 
sobering effects of the Cyprus dispute), in 1957 the Karamanlis government 
decided to accept the deployment of Honest John short-range rockets as well as 
other tactical nuclear weapons.59 In the following year, an agreement with the USA 
was signed for the storage of tactical nuclear warheads under the dual-key system 
that presupposed the consent of both parties for the use of nuclear weapons.60 
After the fall of the Greek junta and despite the crisis in US-Greek relations and 
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*UHHFH·VZLWKGUDZDOIURP1$72·VLQWHJUDWHGPLOLWDU\FRPPDQGWKH86EDVHVDQG
nuclear warheads were not removed from Greek territory.  
Since then, the debate over the presence of these bases and control of 
nuclear weapons in Greece made headlines from time to time. In February 1975, 
despite opposition from the Ford administration, the US Congress imposed an 
arms embargo on Turkey, mainly as a means to press the latter to make 
concessions for a settlement in Cyprus. This angered Turkey, which suspended the 
operation of several US facilities and demanded the repeal of the arms embargo. In 
March 1976, the US and Turkish governments reached a four-year agreement to 
improve bilateral military cooperation. According to the new Defence Cooperation 
Agreement (DCA), the United States would provide 1 billion in military aid to 
Turkey divided in annual instalments, a significant step for repeal of the Congress-
imposed embargo. As a response, Greece demanded that any future US-Greek 
base agreement should entail similar provisions and that US military aid to Greece 
should be adequate enough to enable the latter preserve the balance of power in 
the Aegean.61  
2Q$SULOWKHWKHQ6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWH+HQU\.LVVLQJHUDQG*UHHFH·V
Foreign Minister, Dimitris Bitsios, signed an agreement committing both sides to 
Greek sovereignty and military command of the four US bases: Souda Bay naval 
base on Crete that could anchor the whole Sixth Fleet; the Hellenicon Air Base; 
Nea Marki and Heraklion Communication installation base. Operation by US 
forces ZHUH DOORZHG ¶WR VHUYH RQO\ WKH SXUSRVHV· DXWKRUL]HG E\ *UHHFH This 
agreement was part of a package deal for a new defence cooperation agreement 
with the USA (DCA)- which, however, was never ratified by the conservative ND 
governments.62 By 1977, the main tenets of the US-Greek agreement were 
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established, according to which Greece would be entitled to 700 million dollars in 
military aid spread over four years (that is, 70 per cent of the amount appropriated 
for Turkey). This signified, at least de facto, the establishment of a 7:10 ratio which 
determined in subsequent years the level of US military aid for Greece with 
relation to Turkey.63 Then, the new ND government under Georgios Rallis sought 
to use the status of the US bases as a bargaining chip to achieve acceptable 
conditions for *UHHFH·V UH-LQWHJUDWLRQ LQ 1$72·V PLOLWDU\ FRPPDQG VWUXFWXUH.64 
Finally, while Greece re-HQWHUHG1$72·VPLOLWDU\VWUXFWXUH LQ ODWH2FWREHU
the Rallis government announced on 16 June 1980 the suspension of US-Greek 
talks on the future of the bases until after the October 1981 Greek election.65 
When Andreas Papandreou came to power, and despite electoral pledges for 
removal of bases, he started negotiating the modification of the 1977 DCA 
agreement covering US military activities and bases in Greece as well as US military 
assistance to Greece. Papandreou wanted a formal commitment to a 7:10 ratio, and 
a formal reaffirmation of the 1976 Kissinger security guarantee. Deputy Foreign 
Minister Giannis Kapsis was put in charge to negotiate a mutually acceptable 
Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) with US Special 
Advisor, Reginald Bartholomew, which would ensure both quantitatively and 
qualitatively the balance of power in the region.66 During the negotiations with 
Greece, the USA had decided to double its assistance to Turkey, thus upsetting the 
Aegean balance and threatening vital Greek interests. Papandreou wrote to Reagan 
to express concerns about the proposed increases bringing a disparity to the 7:10 
aid ratio that was established in 1976-77.67 (FKRLQJ 3DSDQGUHRX·V ZRUGV
Konstantinos Karamanlis, then the President of the Republic and an authoritative 
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voice on foreign affairs. At dinner with Stearns mentioned ¶\RXPD\QRWEHOLHYH
that we face the danger of Turkish attack. You may not even believe that we face 
the danger of expanding Turkish influence at our expense in the Aegean. All 
Greeks do believe these things, however, and because we believe them, you must 
WDNHWKHPLQWRDFFRXQW·68 
By the spring of 1982, both the US administration and the PASOK 
government were trying to embark on negotiations on outstanding problems 
between the two countries. In mid-May 1982 Secretary of State Alexander Haig 
arrived in Athens for talks, while a few days earlier Papandreou had acknowledged 
that despite past and current grievances, ¶we must bear in mind the strategic facts 
which prevail in conjunction with our national problems and the demands of our 
national defence. This also applies to WKH 86 PLOLWDU\ EDVHV LQ *UHHFH·. Haig, 
however, found a chilly atmosphere in Athens. More than 20,000 demonstrators, 
waving UHG IODJV DQGEDQQHUV UHDGLQJ ¶Out with AmerLFDQV· DQG ¶Haig go KRPH· 
gathered near Parliament to protest at the visit.69  
This was just one of the many peace protests that occurred in Athens and 
other Greek cities in this period. Since ² in contrast to other West European states 
² Greece was not facing a direct prospect of missiles being installed, the Greek 
peace movement directed its struggles mostly against the existence of the 
$PHULFDQ PLOLWDU\ EDVHV DQG WKH FRXQWU\·V DVVRFLDWion with any kind of military 
organisation. Greece had a history of involvement in international peace 
mobilisation since the early post-war years, and the first organised peace 
movement was created bearing the name Greek Committee for International 
Détente and Peace (EEDYE), which became part of the Communist-led World 
Peace Council (WPC).70 Despite declaration of non-partisanship, the movement 
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was led by the Greek Communists, who had remained loyal to the Soviet Union. 
As a consequence, EEDYE clearly placed the blame on the USA for the escalation 
of the nuclear arms race. In the summer of 1981, some of its members, with the 
prominent nuclear scientist and a future PASOK MEP, Christos Markopoulos, at 
its helm who had close ties to PASOK, decided to leave EEDYE and form a new 
pacifist movement: the Movement for Peace, Human Rights and National 
Independence .($'($ 7KH IRXQGHUV RI .($'($ KDG IHOW WKDW (('<(·V
peace mobilisation had been essentially Soviet-friendly. Such affiliation had proved 
a weakness for three reasons. Firstly, it falsified the true character of the 
movement, discouraging many people from mobilising who were against nuclear 
weapons per se and refused to subscribe to a purely pro-American or pro-Soviet 
point of view.71 Secondly, the superpower rivalry had led to an escalation of 
DUPDPHQWV ZKLFK UHLQIRUFHG VRFLHW\·V VHQVH RI XUJHQF\ unease and fear. Society 
demanded that the peace effort be directed towards both superpowers.72 Thirdly 
DQG EDUHO\ GLVFXVVHG LQ SXEOLF 3$62.·V decision to establish a separate peace 
movement constituted an attempt to create an anti-nuclear movement, free from 
the control of the Communist Party (KKE). The aim was to create a PASOK-led 
Panhellenic peace movement, with centres in all major cities, which would 
overturn Communist dominance of the Greek peace movement.73 
Papandreou, who at the time was still the leader of the opposition, 
embraced and actively supported the creation of KEADEA in the summer of 1981 
VD\LQJ¶IRUWKH*UHHNSHRSOHWKHLVVXHRISHDFHDFTXLUHV a special meaning. We are 
hosting American military bases as well as nuclear weapons, with the acquiescence 
of the Right. At the same time, we are facinJ ´$WWLODµ LQ &\SUXV DQG WKH
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H[SDQVLRQDU\ SROLFLHV RI 7XUNH\ LQ WKH $HJHDQ·74 In its founding declaration, 
KEADEA emphasized the need for Greek independence, the demand for removal 
of all bases and the full liberation of Greece from any foreign intervention in any 
aspect of political, economic and socio-cultural life. So, from early on, Papandreou 
and KEADEA were negotiating the terms of peace along nationalist purposes, an 
attack on Right and highlighting the major enemy which was not on the other side 
of the Iron Curtain but on the other side of the Aegean, namely Turkey.  
How GLG3DSDQGUHRX·VDQWL-nuclear initiatives fit in his broader foreign and 
domestic policy goals of ¶peace·? First and foremost, Papandreou genuinely seemed 
to believe that the major victims of heightened Cold War tensions were smaller 
states, and such peace initiatives were set to overcome Cold War divisions, and 
WKXV SURWHFW WKH FRXQWU\·V QDWLRQDO LQWHUHVWV In 1980, he had stated that nuclear 
ZHDSRQV ¶FRQWULEXWHG H[DFWO\ ]HUR WR RXU QDWLRQDO defence ([DFWO\ ]HUR·75 Yet, 
there were other parameters at play. Andreas Papandreou·s simultaneous active 
support of the anti-nuclear movement both in Greece and abroad was ² among 
other things ² a means to satisfy the anti-American appetite of the Greek public in 
a way that would not XQGHUPLQHWKHFRXQWU\·VZHERIZHVWHUQDOOLHVand hence put 
in peril the delicate Greek-Turkish regional balance. 3DSDQGUHRX·VSHDFHLQLWLDWLYHV
DQGKLVJRYHUQPHQW·VKHDY\ LQYROYHPHQW LQ WKHSHDFHPRELOLVDWLRQwas linked to 
his desire to bolster the FRXQWU\·VLQGHSHQGHQWVWDQFHZLWKRXWSRVLQJDGDQJHUWR
its security whilst DGGLQJWKHFRXQWU\·VYRLFHWRLQWHUQDWLRQDOFDOOs for disarmament 
and relaxations of tensions.76 His aim was to put Greece on the map internationally 
by playing the troublemaker or for what he thought RIKLPVHOI¶WKHSHDFHPDNHU·.77  
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This policy also served a key domestic policy goal: he could mollify the 
..(LQRSSRVLQJ86¶DJJUHVVLYHQHVV·. While PASOK had firmly established itself 
DV WKH KHJHPRQLF SDUW\ RI WKH /HIW WKHUH ZHUH FRQFHUQV DERXW ..(·V JURZLQJ
influence in the aftermath of the October 1982 municipal elections. As the British 
embassy was reporting from AtheQV ¶WKH GLVDSSRLQWPHQW DW 3$62.·V ODFN RI
progress in implementing change and at time going off with pre-electoral 
commitments· had caused PASOK·V relative poor performance.78 Moreover, the 
radical party cadres and supporters were expressing grassroots impatience at the 
VORZ SDFH RI FHQWUDOO\ GLUHFWHG ¶&KDQJH·79 However, PASOK had attracted not 
only radical forces but others with ¶bourgeois·- centrist, reformist or technocratic 
tendencies. It was these non-radicals who had subsequently laid down the basic 
lines of government policy. Although rejecting the tenets of social democracy (at 
least in theory), the party had progressively adopted a reformist attitude.80 Thus, 
Papandreou had to steer a careful balance between the left and centre.  
By the end of 1982, KKE was pressing the government to live up to its 
programme of radical change and, in particular, to adopt a more neutralist foreign 
policy. When KKE published the political resolutions of its 11th Congress in late 
December 1982, its criticism was harsher and was concentrated on the 
JRYHUQPHQW·V IDLOXUH WR UHVROYH WKH HFRQRPLF FULVLV DQG WR FDUU\ RXW HOHFWLRQ
pledges to pull out of NATO and the EEC. The text amounted to a denunciation 
of 3DSDQGUHRX·VSROLF\RUZKDWWKH\FDOOHG¶UHIRUPLVP· and an appeal to the rank 
and file of PASOK for united action with the Communists to bring aboXW¶genuine 
change·.81  
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 Therefore, outburst of anti-American ultra-nationalism, dominant in the 
peace discourse, mobilized public opinion, silenced left-wing critics within his 
party and appeased KKE.82 This new type of mass public mobilisation allowed for 
further influence of the masses through one more PASOK-led organization 
(KEADEA). PASOK was able to maintain its radical message of anti-imperialism, 
anti-establishment and anti-Americanism ZKLOH¶EHDWLQJWKHVWLJPDRIFRPPXQLVP·
and thus attract and mobilise large segments of the population.83 The high levels of 
peace PRELOLVDWLRQ DQG KLV JRYHUQPHQW·V HQGRUVHPHQW ERRVWHG 3DSDQGUHRX·V
credibility in his attempts to launch diverse international and transnational 
initiatives for peace.84 But most importantly, the mass peace movement added 
legitimacy to the claims of an independent Greek voice in foreign affairs, 
transcending Cold War barriers and escaping American dominance even when 
Papandreou was negotiating and concluding an agreement on the US bases. The 
domestic parliamentary and public discussion that ensued on this burning foreign 
policy issue was interestingly framed as a discourse on peace.  
In mid-July 1983, the US and Greek governments reached a five-year 
agreement on defence and economic cooperation. Signed on 8 September 1983, 
the agreement saw the continuation of the four existing American bases in Greece 
and the payment of $500 million in US military aid to Greece. The terms of the 
agreement provided that it would be terminable after five years upon written notice 
by either party, to be given five months in advance. Each party could interpret the 
WHUP ¶WHUPLQDEOH· GLIIHUHQWO\ WKXV ERWK :DVKLQJWRQ DQG $WKHQV ZHUH VDWLVILHG 
Talking to reporters,  the Greek Prime Minister EHDPHG ZLWK SULGH VLQFH ¶WKH
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defence agreement with the United States recognizes for the first time our country 
on equal footing and reflects to a large degree our hard-won national 
LQGHSHQGHQFH· Papandreou dubbed the agreement as one of a kind, representing a 
Stunde Null moment and ¶D EUHDN IURP *UHHFH·V dark and dependent past as 
echoed in the agreement of 1953·.85 The Greek government, therefore, presented it 
as a timetable for the removal of the bases.86 Most of the peace movement activists 
wholeheartedly embraced the logic and Athens was plastered with slogans 
GHFODULQJ¶DWODVWDQGHQGRIWKHGHSHQGHQFH « the struggle is being vindicated·.87 
Meanwhile, ExormisiWKHSDUW\ZHHNO\QHZVSDSHUWUXPSHWHGWKDWWKHEDVHV¶ZRXOG
FORVHLQILYH\HDUV·88 
During a parliamentary debate, on 31 October 1983, it is extraordinary how 
the majority of parliamentarians from almost all parties alluded repeatedly to the 
US-Greek defence agreement as part of the development of the Euromissiles crisis 
and the intense pan ² European peace PRELOLVDWLRQDVZHOODV*UHHFH·VUROHLQWKH
policy of peace. Indeed, the PASOK MPs reverted again and again to the 
buzzwords of national independence, but significantly underlined the defensive 
character of the bases that guaranteed the peaceful policy of Greece towards the 
Middle East, as they supposedly could not be used against any military campaigns 
in the region. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Giannis Kapsis, who 
negotiated the defence agreement, noted how: ¶SUHYLRXV DJUHHPHQWV UHVHPEOHG a 
prenuptial agreement for a happy marriage with the Americans [...] In contrast, our 
agreement bares the characteristics of a negotiated settlement following the filing 
of divorce proceedings·.89 Along the same lines, Ioannis Charalampopoulos, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, underlined the completely different nature of the 
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agreement. He declared that, in contrast to past practices of striking deals behind 
closed doors and secret protocols, the new defence agreements were openly 
negotiated and presented to the Greek people. ¶This was a victory for 
democracy·90 All parties of the opposition conceded that the current agreement 
did not bind the Greek Parliament in 1988 to remove the bases, hence lamented 
PASOK for ¶negating its electoral promises and transposing the heavy load of the 
GHFLVLRQWRWKHQH[WJRYHUQPHQW·91 PASOK claimed otherwise, pointing out that 
the new agreement signalled a new era in US-Greek relations and Greek foreign 
policy and meant WKH ¶HQGRI*UHHFH·V sXEMXJDWLRQ WR WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV· and the 
termination of any US control on the formulation of Greek security policy.92 Most 
importantly, it provided peace in the short and distant future: in the short term, it 
VWUHQJWKHQHG *UHHFH·V defence capabilities against possible Turkish aggression, 
while in the long term, LW JXDUDQWHHG WKH FRXQWU\·V UHPRYDO DV D SRVVLEOH VLWH RI
Cold War confrontation. 
 
3DSDQGUHRX·VLQWHUQDWLRQDOLQLWLDWLYHV 
While Greece was negotiating the existence of the US bases on its soil and its part 
in NATO, it became the first NATO country to propose a nuclear weapons-free 
zone in the Balkans (NWFZ). The Bulgarian government had been seeking to 
revive the 1957 Romanian proposal for the denuclearization of the region, but with 
little success.93 Then, on 22 November 1981, Papandreou gave his first major 
policy address DQGSRLQWHGRXWWKDW¶the government is proposing a denuclearized 
zone in the Balkans. Greece, after the necessary deliberations, will first apply, in a 
short period of time, by this principle by removing nuclear weapons from its 
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WHUULWRU\·.94 Of course, the significance of such a proposal was from the beginning 
psychological rather than practical: in case of an East-West war in Europe, a 
nuclear-free zone in the Balkans would not have spared the region from a nuclear 
exchange.95 
Yet, Papandreou and the Romanian leader Ceausescu took up the initiative 
several months later. During Papandreou·V YLVLW WR 5Rmania in early November 
1982, the two leaders agreed that their governments should call a summit 
conference of Balkan leaders to discuss turning the region into a zone free of 
nuclear weapons within 18 months. The objective would be to put pressure on the 
UHVWRI(XURSHWR¶GHQXFOHDUL]H·; there were already no nuclear arms in Scandinavia, 
so the addition of suFKD]RQHLQWKH%DONDQVZRXOG¶no doubt ha[ve] its effect in 
influencing similar devHORSPHQWV LQ WKH UHVW RI (XURSH·. For the Greek Prime 
Minister, his interest stemmed from his opposition to the existence of the two 
military blocs and reiterated that his government ultimately wanted to expel 
American bases from Greece and withdraw from NATO·V LQWHJUDWHG PLOLWDU\
command structure.96  
Then, during the visit of Soviet Premier Nikolai Tikhonov to Greece in 
February 1983, the Greek and the Soviet governments agreed that nuclear 
weapons free zones were an important aspect of the disarmament process and 
called for the limitation of both coQYHQWLRQDO DQG QXFOHDU DUPV WR ¶WKH ORZHVW
SRVVLEOH OHYHO· on the basis of equal security.97 ¶*UHHFH DV WKH PDYHULFN RI WKH
western alliance, has in Soviet eyes the potential to play a role analogous to that of 
Romania  in the Warsaw pact.· 98  More than a year later (in May 1984), in a press 
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conference about the Initiative of the Six (see below), Papandreou added that the 
QXFOHDUZDUKHDGVLQ*UHHFHZHUHDSURYRFDWLRQDQGDWKUHDWDJDLQVWSHDFH¶:HGLG
QRWWDNHDQ\VSHFLILFPHDVXUHVWRUHPRYHWKHVHZHDSRQV·KHVDLG¶QRWEHFDXVHZH
have changed our view, but because we want to do it ² if possible- within the 
IUDPHZRUNRI%DONDQGLVDUPDPHQW·99 
The initiative to discuss the possibility of a Balkan NWFZ was part of a 
continuing Greek effort to establish an institutionalized framework for multilateral 
Balkan cooperation.100 However, the Balkan governments had conflicting views 
and attitudes regarding the establishment of a regional zone, while some were 
insisting on a broader agenda and others had been uninterested not only to the 
specific idea but also to any Balkan negotiating forum. The Greek government, 
therefore, understood that a multilateral high-level summit could not be held in the 
IRUHVHHDEOH IXWXUH 7KXV $WKHQV RSWHG IRU SURSRVLQJ DQ H[SHUWV· PHHWLQJ WKDW
would help pave the way for a future summit. On 18 May 1983, Papandreou sent 
confidential letters to the leaders of Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania and 
7XUNH\ LQYLWLQJ WKHP WR VHQG ¶TXDOLILHG H[SHUWV· WR D FRQIHUHQFH WR EH KHOG LQ
Athens in the near future to discuss the NWFZ proposal. This did not have any 
conclusive and tangible results, as Turkey essentially objected the separation of 
Balkans from the rest of Europe regarding arms control and/or disarmament.101 
The main Greek opposition party, the conservative New Democracy and 
particularly its leader, Evangelos Averoff, repeatedly opposed the idea. The latter 
claimed that the initiative was causing additional friction between Greece and its 
NATO and EEC allies; furthermore, if such a zone were established, the West 
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would unilaterally have made concessions to the Warsaw Pact.102 Throughout the 
Cold War era, NATO remained steadfast in its position that any reduction in its 
theatre nuclear forces was conditional on a considerable reduction of both 
Soviet/Warsaw Pact tactical nuclear weapons and conventional weapons, as a 
PHDQVWRRIIVHWWKH6RYLHWEORF·VFRQYHQWLRQDOVXSHULRULW\LQ(XURSH 
In fact3DSDQGUHRX·V widely publicized initiative was proposed to Warsaw 
Pact members without even informing ² let alone consulting ² *UHHFH·V1$72
allies in advance, provoking outrage in several NATO capitals. The Greek proposal 
was clearly at odds with the approved NATO strategy and had serious implications 
for the alliance as a whole, and not just on its South-eastern region. For instance, 
WKH8.GHOHJDWLRQ WR1$72 LQVLVWHG WKDW ¶WKLV LV D FDVHZhere we should bring 
home to the Greeks that such clear disregard for the views of their allies on major 
security issues is uQDFFHSWDEOH·DQGWKDWXQWLOWKH*UHHNSURSRVDOZRXOGKDYHIXOO\
and in detail discussed in the alliance, no discussion with Warsaw pact 
governments should take place.103 
However, other policymakers, who were better informed of Papandreou·V 
idiosyncrasy and motives, such the British Consul General in Athens, Michael 
Llewellyn Smith, were far less alarmed. The latter explained to the FCO that one 
VKRXOGDOZD\VNHHSLQWKH¶EDFNJURXQGDQGFRQWH[WRI3DSDQGUHRX·VSURSRVDO·WKLV
had to be vieweG ¶PRUH DV D PRYH LQ D GLSORPDWLF JDPH GHVLJQHG WR JLYH KLV
supporters the impression of activity than a serious initiative aimed at achieving 
GHQXFOHDUL]DWLRQ·$V3DSDQGUHRXKDGEHHQDOVRFKDPSLRQLQJ² in words, but not 
in deeds ² the removal of US nuclear weapons from Greece, a well-publicized 
gesture RQ WKH LVVXHRI D%DONDQ1:)=DLPHG WR VDWLVI\3$62.·V DQG/HIWLVW
supporters ² especially at a time when US-Greek negotiations on the future of US 
bases in Greece were about to enter the decisive final stage.104 It is important to 
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note that the US intelligence community also reached the same conclusion: while 
the Americans estimated that the NWFZ concept did have deep roots in Socialist 
DQG 3DSDQGUHRX·V WKLQNLQJ LW ZDV QHYHUWKHOHVV PRVW SUREDEOH WKDW WKH Greek 
prime minister wDV VHHNLQJ WRXVH WKH LVVXH WR ¶fend off attacks from the Greek 
Communists. Advocacy of a zone allows Papandreou to demonstrate that he is 
¶VWUXJJOLQJ IRU SHDFH· DQG GHIOHFWV FULWLFLVP KH UHFHLYHV IRU KDYLQJ VLJQHG DQ
agreement allowiQJ86EDVHVWRUHPDLQLQ*UHHFH·.105  
Nevertheless, it can be argued that the Greek initiative should be seen in a 
EURDGHUFRQWH[WRI*UHHFH·VGpWHQWHSROLF\WRZDUGVWKH6RYLHWEORFDQGSDUWLFXODUO\
the Balkan Warsaw Pact members ² neighbouring Bulgaria as well as Romania ² at 
a time when Cold War tensions had been heightened both globally and across 
Europe. Indeed, some Greek officials hinted this to their NATO colleagues.106 
$QGUHDV 3DSDQGUHRX DQG WKH *UHHN GLSORPDWV ZHUH IXOO\ DZDUH RI 7XUNH\·V IODW
opposition to any regionaO1:)=LQLWLDWLYH<XJRVODYLD·V relative disinterest in the 
LGHDDQG$OEDQLD·VGLVLQFOLQDWLRQWRSDUWLFLSDWHin any form of Balkan co-operation 
as long as most Balkan states remained member of the military blocs.107 So, while 
Papandreou aimed to keep the Balkan NWFZ idea alive as a means to facilitate 
5RPDQLD·V DQG HVSHFLDOO\ %XOJDULD·V LQWHUHVW LQ D EURDG GLDORJXH RQ %DONDQ FR-
operation on other issues, he did not expect his denuclearization initiative to go 
too far.108  
As early as February 1982, Greek career diplomats had been assessing the 
implications of discussing a Balkan NWFZ and had been fully aware that the 1981 
Bulgarian proposal was endorsed by the Kremlin, mainly because Moscow and 
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Sofia wished to capitalize on this idea as a piece of anti-NATO propaganda. 
However, during 1982-1983 they were arguing that, under certain conditions, 
Greece should not avail itself of the opportunity to embrace the idea: the country 
would probably get some extra leverage vis-à-vis the United States during the 
upcoming negotiations for the future of the US bases; Turkey might find itself 
relatively isolDWHGLQWKH%DONDQV*UHHFH·VSRVLWLRQZRXOGEHHQKDQFHGERWKZLWKLQ
the socialist bloc and the Third World; promotion of Greece at an international 
level as a genuinely peaceful country championing denuclearization. Of course, 
possible disadvantages also existed, especially with regard to DUHDFWLRQE\*UHHFH·V
powerful allies which strongly opposed such ideas (mainly the United States, the 
Federal Republic of Germany and Italy).109  
(YHQ EHIRUH 3DSDQGUHRX·V LQLWLDWLYH WR UHYLYe the concept of a Balkan 
NWFZ, 3$62.·VJRYHUQPHQWhad also favoured, in principle, the declaration of 
WKH 0HGLWHUUDQHDQ DV D ¶zone of SHDFH· and de-nuclearized area. According to 
3DSDQGUHRX·VVWDWHPHQWRI1RYHPEHU¶the Mediterranean must belong to 
its peoples without the presence of superpower fleets and without military 
H[HUFLVHV·.110 This proposal had been already elaborated by the USSR and Brezhnev 
himself on 9 June 1981. It had been put forward by the Non-Aligned Movement 
and the UN General Assembly, but NATO authorities flatly rejected such a 
prospect and concept.111 7KHSURSRVDOWR¶turn the Mediterranean Sea into a zone 
RI SHDFH DQG FROODERUDWLRQ· along with the denuclearization of the Balkans and 
other regions in Europe was reiterated by the Warsaw Pact on 7 January 1983.112 It 
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had been one of many Soviet and/or Warsaw Pact calls to the West to engage in 
arms control talks. PapandrHRX UXVKHG LQWRZHOFRPLQJ WKLV ¶FRXUDJHRXVRIIHU· to 
NATO with great enthusiasm.113 
Meanwhile, East-West tension was further rising as the year 1983 had 
already featured many gloomy developments and moments, VXFKDV5HDJDQ·V¶Evil 
Empire· speech and his announcement of the SDI, plus the pending deployment 
of the high-tech and highly accurate Pershing II and Cruise missiles.114 Then, in 
August 1983, and while the signature of the DECA between Athens and 
Washington was imminent, Papandreou felt that the time was ripe to undertake 
another well-publicized gesture. Once again, he took *UHHFH·V :HVWHUQ DOOLHV by 
surprise, as the Greek government, which had recently assumed the presidency of 
the EEC for the first time, requested that the latter should discuss the issue of the 
INF arms race and proposed a six-month postponement of the deployment of the 
PHUVKLQJ,,DQG&UXLVHPLVVLOHVDVLWZRXOGKRSHIXOO\¶give the Geneva negotiations 
the breaWKLQJVSDFHWKH\FHUWDLQO\QHHG·.115  
*UHHFH·VDOOLHVIODWO\UHMHFWHGWKDWSURSRVDO116 They considered that sufficient 
time had been already provided to the Soviet leadership to acknowledge the 
necessity of reaching an agreement about the INF since December 1979 and 
1$72·V dual-track decision. If NATO was about to have any success at the 
ongoing negotiations, it should continue the deployment program as scheduled; 
WKHDOOLDQFHZRXOGEHZLOOLQJWR¶VWRSDPHQGRUUHYHUVH·WKHGHSOR\PHQWSURJUDP
¶VKRXOGVXFFHVVDWWKHQHJRWLDWLQJWDEOHZDUUDQWLW·)XUWKHUPRUH*UHHFH·V1$72
and EEC partners considered that this initiative hDGEHHQ ¶WKHZRUVWH[DPSOH WR-
date of the Greeks dissociating themselves from the agreed alliance position on 
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,1)·7KH\ZHUHJUHDWO\GLVWXUEHGE\ WKHSURSRVDORIGLVFXVVLQJ VXFKD VHQVLWLYH
1$72LVVXHWKDWLVWKHDOOLDQFH·VQXFOHDUVWUDWHJ\DWWKH((&Dnd that Athens was 
VHHNLQJ¶WRXVHWKH3UHVLGHQF\WRIXUWKHUWKHLUPDYHULFNYLHZV·2WKHU fora existed 
for this purpose, while certainly, the EEC had nothing to do with military matters, 
1$72·VVWUDWHJ\and defence planning.117  
In addition, although it was clear that Greece could not be brought round to 
support NATO·V INF policy, the United States, Britain, the FRG and other 
countries (such as Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium) responded firmly by 
publicly rejecting that proposal. The Americans, in particular, became furious. So 
did the Germans, ZKRZHUHILUPO\LQWKHOHDGLQH[SUHVVLQJWKDW3DSDQGUHRX¶KDV
RYHUVWHSSHGWKHPDUNRIZKDWKLVDOOLHVZLOOWROHUDWH·118 At the same time, another 
Cold War incident increased tension between Greece and its major allies. On 1 
September 1983, Korean Air Lines flight 007, which had drifted off its correct 
flight path and had passed over prohibited Soviet air-space, was shot down by 
Soviet fighters. The 269 passengers and crew died, sparking international outrage 
and triggering the imposition of sanctions by the United States and other Western 
countries on the Soviet Union.119  The Greek government did not follow suit 
though; on the contrary, LWEORFNHGD&RPPXQLW\·V MRLQWSXEOLFFRQGHPQDWLRQ of 
the Soviet Union.120 
Still, the Western partners, while worried about the growing isolation of 
Greece from the line of the western institutions, downplayed the possible impact 
of such action. The troublemaking may have been gratifying to the Soviets but the 
maverick behaviour of Greece as a non-basing country was not posing a serious 
threat to Western security.121 The Greek government was aware that the initiative 
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would get nowhere, but still wanted to be able to say that it had raised it and 
engaged with public opinion, regardless of the result, in order to restore the image 
of a radical government and promote the cause of peace, since according to 
Papandreou, at the end of the day ¶*UHHFH·VLQLWLDWLYHFRQWDLQHGDQDSSHDOWRERWK
superpowers·.122 
 
 
¶6L[-1DWLRQ,QLWLDWLYH·IRU3HDFHDQG'LVDUPDPHQW 
3DSDQGUHRX·V policy of peace, despite its strong domestic angle and deep 
nationalistic tone, was endorsed by several prominent leaders from around the 
globe and peace activists across Europe that shared his views.123 Swedish Prime 
Minister Olaf Palme had publicly endorsed *UHHFH·VLQLWLDWLYH for a Balkan NWFZ 
and the two prime ministers complimented each other in speeches on 22 August 
1983, when the latter visited Athens. Palme and Papandreou, who had developed 
strong personal ties, were in full agreement on the urgent QHHG¶WRLQWHUYHQHVLQFH
the two superpowers already have a nuclear arsenal, capable of destroying one 
DQRWKHU PRUH WKDQ ILIW\ WLPHV·.124 The two countries were on the same page on 
several issues.  
 It comes as no surprise, therefore that on 22 May 1984, Andreas 
Papandreou joined five other heads of state and government ² including India·V 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (succeeded by Rajiv Gandhi), Swedish Prime 
0LQLVWHU 2ORI 3DOPH 0H[LFR·V President Miguel de la Madrid, $UJHQWLQD·V
President Raul Alfonsin and President of Tanzania Julius Nyerere ² to launch the 
¶6L[-1DWLRQ,QLWLDWLYH· RU¶Five &RQWLQHQW,QLWLDWLYH·for Peace and Disarmament.125  
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Explaining Greece·V UROH LQ VXFK D JOREDO LQLWLDWLYH 3DSDQGUHRX QRWHG ¶, EHOLHYH
that the prevention of nuclear war is not an issue that concerns only superpowers. 
It is of direct concern to all of us since it threatens our lives. Therefore, any 
attempt aiming at achieving a positive solution cannot be left exclusively to the 
VXSHUSRZHUV·126 The idea was originally promoted in mid-1983 by the international 
network of politicians working together on disarmament - the Parliamentarians for 
World Order (PWO) -  and its President, Mr D Roche, a Canadian PM.127 Leaders 
such as ,QGLUD*DQGKL XQGHUVWRRG WKDW ¶SHDFH LV WRR LPSRUWDQW WR EH OHIW WR WKH
White House and the .UHPOLQ·128  
The declaration of May 1984 was handed to UN secretary-general Javier 
Perez De Cuellar, who had a positive reaction, and to UN missions in the Soviet 
Union, USA, China, Britain and France. The declaration called on states with 
nuclear weapons to halt what the document calls ¶a rush towards global suicide· 
and to facilitate an agreement on nuclear arms control. The statement attracted 
unexpectedly broad attention in media and parliaments. Even Pope John Paul II 
offered his encouragement for this initiative in May 1984 and it was endorsed by a 
large number of peace organizations.129 Prime Minister Gonzalez of Spain, 
Trudeau of Canada and Sorsa of Finland added their support.130  
The Six national leaders issued several joint declarations to advance their 
goals and focused on prevention of an arms race in outer space and the need for a 
nuclear test ban. In May 1984, WKH\ FDOOHG RQ WKH ILYH QXFOHDU SRZHUV ¶WR VWRS
testing, production, and deployment of weapons of mass destruction and to 
undertake substantial UHGXFWLRQV LQQXFOHDUIRUFHV· ,WFRQFOXGHGWKDW ¶SURJUHVV LQ
disarmament can only be achieved with an informed public applying strong 
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pressure on governments·131 The Americans and French were dismissive of the 
appeal and the British showed clear lack of enthusiasm.132 The Soviets published a 
statement pointing that the declaration was in the same direction as Soviet 
proposals for a nuclear freeze. Greece was the only NATO country to sign the 
declaration, and Papandreou justified that by stating WKDW ¶NATO is a democracy 
and we have the right to disagree with some of the over-all initiatives·.133  
In October 1984, Papandreou paid an official visit to Sweden and had many 
contacts with members of the Swedish Social Democracy Party. They discussed 
the Five Continent declaration and its follow up. Papandreou launched an attack 
on the US, claiming that it was ¶5HDJDQ·V HPRWLRQDOGHVLUH WR UHJDLQ WKHPLOLWDU\
superiority which American had possessed before détente which lay behind the 
FXUUHQWDUPVVSLUDO>«@ZKLOHLQWKH6RYLHW8QLRQWKHUHZDVDGHHS-rooted fear of a 
KRORFDXVW·134 $IWHUKLVPRWKHU·Vassassination, Rajiv Gandhi continued to promote 
the initiative and made his debut as an international statesman by hosting a further 
meeting of representatives of the six countries in January 1985 in India. The 
conference issued a communique ² the Delhi Declaration ² which called for an 
immediate ban on testing nuclear weapons and a halt to their development, 
especially of space weapons.135 Papandreou was particularly worried about the 
increase of speed and accuracy of modern nuclear weapons and delivery systems, 
¶which makes reason impossible to prevail. Everyone should fear a nuclear 
holocaust because the nuclear winter would probably affect every human being·.136 
Following the New Delhi meeting, three of the leaders ² Alfonsin, Nyerere 
and Palme ² flew to Athens to attend a meeting, hosted by Papandreou with some 
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50 leaders of non-governmental organizations as well as prominent legislators and 
personalities (anti-nuclear campaigners and intellectuals) supporting the Five 
Continent initiative. Prominent former prime ministers and other politicians, such 
as Edgar Faure, Pierre Trudeau, Joop den Uyl, Bruno Kreisky, and Egon Bahr, 
were also present, while Willy Brandt gave his full support. Ɣhe Athens meeting 
urged the nuclear states WR¶assume their responsibility towards civilization and the 
XQLYHUVDO ULJKW RI OLIH· and transfer resources to economic development, while 
Papandreou observed ¶the battle of the streets has become the battle of the 
governments·.137 The six leaders pledged tRFRQYH\WKH,QLWLDWLYH·VPHVVDJHWRWKH
two superpowers and the other three nuclear powers (the UK, France and China) 
and soon Papandreou had the opportunity to put forward the cause of nuclear 
disarmament during his subsequent talks with the Soviet and Chinese leadership.138 
Moreover, during an official visit in Sofia in July 1985, the Greek prime minister 
GHFODUHG WKDW ¶small non-nuclear states have not only a right but a duty to 
participate in the struggle to promote détente and to prevent the militarization of 
VSDFH·.139 
During 1986, the Six-nation/Five Continent Initiative continued to call for 
the halt to all nuclear testing and the development of new nuclear weapons in 
1986. Such a plea to the US and Soviet governments had been already signed by 
Olof Palme only hours before his assassination on 28 February 1986. The leaders 
of the six countries offered to undertake the task of verifying such a test ban, in an 
effort to remove doubts about compliance and possible violations.140 The Group 
of Six held its second meeting in Ixtapa, Mexico, on 6 August 1986 and reiterated 
its plea for a ban on nuclear testing and the abolishment of the SDI/Star Wars 
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space defense project, to be followed by the conclusion of a US-Soviet arms 
reduction treaty and its readiness to offer their good services to verify compliance, 
should a US-Soviet test ban treaty was eventually signed.141 In any case, by that 
time the two superpowers had already initiated a policy of rapprochement, while, 
despite the setbacks suffered, their negotiations focused on nuclear arms 
control/reduction.142 Thus, not only the Initiative of the Six, but not even the allies 
of the United States and the Soviet Union were in a position to influence 
significantly the course of US-Soviet talks. Papandreou however capitalized on the 
Initiative to wield personal influence as a regional or even global peacemaker and 
PHGLDWRUDQGHQKDQFH*UHHFH·VSUHVWLJH- especially in the Third World.  
 
Conclusions 
Greece, still sober from the experiences of its brutal dictatorship and the double 
Turkish invasion of Cyprus became less convinced by the incessant gesturing 
towards the ubiquitous shadow of an endless crisis that the Cold War fostered, and 
highlighted the need to reduce overdependence on the United States. Most 
significantly, the political establishment and mass political opinion saw in Turkey, 
not across the Iron Curtain, the preeminent threat WR WKHFRXQWU\·V VHFXULW\. The 
fall of superpower détente, the exacerbation of tensions surrounding the 
Euromissile crisis and the consequent rise of nuclear fear contributed to the 
further delegitimization of the Cold War division in the Greek public scene and 
strengthened the constant quest for national independence and pride.  
  It was against this background that Andreas Papandreou rose to power and 
formulated WKHFRXQWU\·V IRUHLJQSROLF\. He was a product of his time but at the 
same time he heavily framed a version of Greek reality that struck an emotional 
cord and became a rallying point for the majority of Greeks. This version beset 
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with an ardently nationalistic rhetoric that required foreign scapegoats was made 
believable because WKH ¶FRQGLWLRQV RI SRVVLELOLW\· WKDW KDG SURGXFHG *UHHNV·
burning quest for independence had reached unprecedented heights by the 1980s. 
In the name of Greek nationalism, Andreas Papandreou had promised his voters 
¶change· in many facets of societal life, but also the FRXQWU\·V IRUHLJQ SROLF\
orientation.  
The Turkish threat however meant that pragmatically he could not deviate 
IURP KLV SUHGHFHVVRUV· SROLF\ RI XWLOLVLQJ ZHVWHUQ fora to guarantee a delicate 
EDODQFHZLWK*UHHFH·V$HJHDQQHLJKERXU. Despite his condemnation of Cold War 
dilemmas and American ¶imperialism·, peace for his country meant continuing 
relations with both NATO and the USA. Even when he was occasionally 
overdoing it by decrying the United States and Western institutions such as 
NATO, Papandreou was aware that extreme courses in foreign policy would prove 
counterproductive and dangerous. TKH *UHHN JRYHUQPHQW·V DFWLRQV DQG
reservations arguably did little ² if actually any ² practical damage to the West, and 
arguably, to Greece itself. 
These restraints, however did not deter Andreas from delivering his anti-
American and anti-establishment message and giving the Greeks the strong 
independent voice they had been yearning for. For him, such a policy was not 
contradictory but part and parcel of fighting for peace. Subscribing to an 
international anti-nuclear cause offered to camouflage the dropping of ² indeed 
carefully articulated ² election pledges to leave NATO, and perhaps the EEC, and 
to remove the US bases from Greece whilst asserting his left-wing credentials and 
SURWHFWLQJWKHFRXQWU\·VFRUHVHcurity needs. Peace projects such as the Initiative of 
the Six and the Balkan NWFZ had not only EHHQDFHQWUDOIHDWXUHLQ3DSDQGUHRX·V
both pre-election and government programme but a global appeal that crucially 
infused a sense of pride in a small and historically dependent country. It did not 
matter if it yielded any concrete objective benefits for the country, as the fervent 
rhetoric that accompanied these moves offered its own texture of reality 
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reconstituted verbally in protest language and nationalistic tone. Ultimately, 
Papandreou was guaranteeing peace for his country in strictly nationalistic terms 
EXWDWWKHVDPHWLPHSURPRWLQJDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOSHDFHFDXVHWKDWHOHYDWHG*UHHFH·V
status. He was neither a troublemaker as his opponents claimed or a stirmaker as 
his allies would suggest, but his own brand of a peacemaker. 
 
